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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH FRONT REGIONAL COUNCIL, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
SCOTT M. MATHESON, Governor of 
the State of Utah, ROBERT B. 
HANSEN, Attorney General of 
the State of Utah, and JOHN 
RAY McEVILLY, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 16340 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action seeking construe-
tion of the provisions of Sections 39-1-35 and 39-3-2, Utah 
Code Ann. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Motions for summary judgment were filed by all parties 
and were argued before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor on Decem-
ber 15, 1978. The court entered its Order on February 2, 
1979, granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and 
denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Order entered below 
on February 2, 1979. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wasatch Front is a regional council of the governments 
in the metropolitan area along the geographical Wasatch 
Front area. Its purpose is to provide a forum for study and 
discussion of regional problems of mutual interest to the 
County Councils of Government within the region, and to 
prepare comprehensive plans for the growth and development 
of the region. (R. p. 22). 
Wasatch Front is a voluntary association having the 
separate legal status necessary to carry out its functions. 
It was created pursuant to the Utah Interlocal Co-operation 
Act,§§ 11-13-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (R. p.23). 
Membership of Wasatch Front is currently comprised of 
the Salt Lake County Council of Governments, Davis County 
Community Correlation Council, Weber Area Council of Govern-
ments, Tooele County Council of Governments, and the Morgan 
County Coucil of Governments. ( R. p. 23). 
Wasatch Front currently employs 24 individuals. One of 
its employees, defendant John Ray McEvilly, is also a member 
of the Utah Air National Guard (Guard). Two other Wasatch 
Front employees, Michale Coulam and Douglas Hatterly, are 
-2-
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members of the organized Reserves of the United States mili-
tary forces (Reserves). (R. p. 24). 
It has been, and continues to be, the policy of wasatch 
Front to allow its employees, who are also members of the 
Reserves or Guard, leaves of absence from their jobs for 
their required annual training with the Reserves or Guard. 
(R. p. 24). 
Prior to March 23, 1978, Wasatch Front paid such Re-
serve and Guard personnel the full pay they would have 
received for such annual training periods had they been 
performing their duties for Wasatch Front in addition to the 
pay they received from the Guard or Reserves. (R. p.24). 
On March 23, 1978, Wasatch Front adopted a resolution 
changing its military leave pay policy for all of its 
employees. This new policy provides that Wasatch Front will 
supplement the employee's military pay to the level of his 
full Wasatch Front pay, by paying the difference between 
what the employee would have earned had he been performing 
his duties for wasatch Front, rather than in military ser-
vice for the Reserves or Guard, and the pay received by the 
employee from the Reserves or Guard. (R. pp. 24-25). 
At the time Kasatch Front adopted this new policy, 
several other agencies, organizations and governmental 
subdivisions had similar policies of supplementing pay of 
Individuals on military leave. The new policy was adopted 
-3-
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in the good faith belief that Wasatch Front was not an or-
ganization subject to the provisions of §§ 39-1-35 or 39-3-2, 
Utah Code Ann., or if subject thereto, that the policy thus 
adopted was in accordance with the provisions of said sta-
tutes. (R. p. 25). 
Defendant McEvilly brought suit in U.S. District Court, 
District of Utah, against Wasatch Front and its individual 
members, claiming that Wasatch Front's policy regarding mili-
tary leave pay violated the provisions of §§ 39-1-35 and 
39-3-2, Utah Code Ann., and thereby violated his civil rights 
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and his veteran's reemploy-
ment rights under 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d). He claims that the 
Utah statutes entitle him to his full pay as an employee of 
Wasatch Front for the period of time in which he participated 
in Guard training in addition to his Guard pay. 
The instant declaratory judgment action was commenced 
by Wasatch Front to resolve these disputed state law issues, 
which have not been addressed in any reported cases of this 
state. United States District Judge A. Sherman Christensen 
ordered that the federal court retain jurisdiction over the 
federal case but abstain from proceeding further pending a 
final determination in state court of these issues of state 
law. 
Motions for summary judgment in the instant case were 
filed by all parties, and were argued before the Honorable 
-4-
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G. Hal Taylor on December 15, 1978. There was no court 
reporter present. Judge Taylor granted defendants' motions 
and denied plaintiff's. 
Counsel for defendant McEvilly prepared and submitted 
a proposed Order for approval by the parties. As counsel 
for plaintiff could not approve said proposed Order, they 
filed their objections. (R. pp. 70-72). On February 2, 1979, 
Judge Taylor signed and entered the order prepared by counsel 
for defendant McEvilly, and on March 1, 1979, plaintiff filed 
a Notice of Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTIONS 39-1-35 and 39-3-2 EACH APPLY TO 
DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMPLOYEES, AND 
TO MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. 
Section 39-1-35 was originally enacted in 1917. Its 
material language has not changed since that time, and pre-
sently provides: 
All state employees who are or shall become 
members of the national guard of this state 
shall be allowed full pay for all time spent 
on duty at annual encampments or rifle compe-
titions or other duties in connection with 
the national guard not in service and such 
time shall not be deducted from any vacations 
such employees may be entitled to .... 
This section clearly applies to state employees who are 
members of the national guard. 
-5-
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In 1941, with the impetus of World War II, § 39-3-1, 
Utah Code Ann., was adopted. It also has not changed in its 
material parts since its enactment, and presently provides: 
Every officer and employee of the state or of 
any county, municipal corporation, or govern-
mental district who enlists or is called or 
inducted into and enters active service in the 
state militia or any branch of the federal 
military, naval, or marine service shall be 
entitled to absent himself from his duties or 
service while engaged in the performance of 
active military or naval duty and while going 
to and returning from such duty. No such 
officer or employee shall be subjected by any 
person directly or indirectly by reason of 
such absence to any loss or diminution of va-
cation or holiday privilege or be prejudiced 
by reason of such absence with reference to 
promotion or continuances in office, employ-
ment, reappointment to office, or re-employment. 
This section is applicable to a broader range of emplo-
yees than § 39-1-35, as it covers both employees of the 
state and also those of any county, municipal corporation, 
or governmental district. Further, the coverage extends 
beyond service in the state militia to also include service 
in any branch of the federal military, naval or marine 
service. It was intended to ensure that the enumerated 
public employees would not suffer any diminution of benefits 
upon their return from active duty. 
The title of this 1941 act clearly denotes the scope of 
both the public employees covered and the military organiza-
tions included in this section: 
-6-
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GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY SERVICE 
An Act relating to State Officers and Employees 
in Military Service and to Provide That All 
Officers and Employees of the State or Any Muni-
cipal Corporation or Political Subdivision of 
the State Who Are Members of the National Guard, 
Naval Mllitia, Members of the Reserve Corps of 
the United States Army or Forces in the Federal 
Military, Naval, or Marine Service May Be Absent 
From Their Places of Employment. Chapter 105, 
Laws of Utah 1941 (emphasis added). 
Thus the distinction is made between employees of the 
state, of a municipal corporation, and of a political subdi-
vision of the state. The distinction is also made between 
members of the National Guard and members of the Reserve 
Corps. 
In 1955 the legislature enacted§ 39-3-2, Utah Code Ann., 
which has not been altered since its enactment, and which 
provides: 
All state employees and all employees of any 
county and municipality thereof who are or 
shall become members of the organized reserve 
of the United States army, navy, air force 
and marines, shall be allowed full pay for 
all time not in excess of fifteen days per 
year spent on duty at annual encampment or 
rifle competition or other duties in connec-
tion with the reserve training and instruc-
tion requirements of the army, navy, air 
force and marines of the United States. 
This leave shall be in addition to annual 
vacation leave with pay. 
Thus the legislature again changed the scope of indi-
viduals covered in this statue from the 1917 and 1941 acts. 
The 1955 act covers both state employees and employees of 
-7-
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counties and municipalities, but does not include the ern-
ployees of governmental districts and political subdivisions 
which were included in the 1941 statue. Further, the 1955 
act does not cover members of the National Guard, as did 
both the 1917 and 1941 statutes. 
POINT II 
SECTION 39-1-35 APPLIES ONLY TO MEMBERS OF 
THE GOARD, AND SECTION 39-3-2 APPLIES ONLY 
TO MEMBERS OF THE RESERVE 
Defendants contend that members of the Guard are covered 
by both the 1917 statute (§ 39-1-35) and the 1955 statute 
(§ 39-3-2). As discussed above, the language of§ 39-1-35 
does expressly cover members of the National Guard. However, 
defendants claim that the National Guard is one branch of the 
"organized reserve of the United States army, navy, air force 
and marines," and therefore is included under that provision 
of §39-3-2. They base their claim upon a federal definition 
contained in 10 U.S.C. § 261(a): 
The reserve components of the armed forces are: 
(1) The Army National Guard of the United States. 
(2) The Army Reserve. 
(3) The Naval Reserve. 
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve. 
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States. 
(6) The Air Force Reserve 
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve. 
Nevertheless, §39-3-2 uses the terms "organized _£_~serve cf 
the United States army, navy, air force and marines" (emphas1s 
added). Those organizations are specifically listed as items ·1 
-8-
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(3), (4) and (6) above, and it is doubtful that the Utah 
Legislature intended to include the three unnamed organiza-
tions by naming four others. 
Even though the federal definition of reserve components 
does include the Guard, the state is in no way bound by such 
a definition, and it is not precluded from utilizing different 
definitions or terminology. 
Further, defendants' interpretation leads to an untenable 
conclusion. If, as defendants contend, § 39-3-2 applies to 
state employees who are members of the Guard, then it is 
totally duplicative of parallel provisions in § 39-1-35, and 
there is therefore no meaning left in much of § 39-1-35. Rules 
of statutory construction suggest just the oposite result: 
that the statutes be read together giving meaning to the 
provisions of both. 
This rule of construction was stated by the court in 
In re Utah Savings and Loan Ass'n., 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P.2d 
929 (1968): 
If the latter statute could be looked at 
separately as the whole law on the subject, 
the contestants' position might have merit. 
But that is not the way statutes are to be 
interpreted and applied. It is true here, 
as it is in so many areas of the law, that 
one statute has been enacted at one time with 
a particular purpose in mind, and that ano-
ther has been enacted at another time with 
a different purpose in mind. When this has 
been done and there is an apparent conflict, 
it is not proper to put all the emphasis to 
-9-
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one statute, as though it stated all of the 
law on the subject to the exclusion of the 
other. They should be looked at together, 
in theic relationship to each other, with a 
view to reconciling any such appacent con-
flict and giving each its intended effect 
insofar as that can be accomplished without 
nullifying the other. 442 P.2d at 931-32 
(emphasis added). 
The historical discussion earlier indicates that the 
terms "National Guard" and "Reserves" wece used by the 
legislature to connote different organizations, and that 
legislative intent should prevail over the federal defini-
tion. By following this approach, each statute retains 
meaning with no duplication, and each can be given its 
intended effect. 
Thus, §39-1-35 is only applicable to members of the 
Guard, and § 39-3-2 is only applicable to members of the 
Reserve. As defendant McEvilly is a member of the Guard, 
§39-3-2 is inapplicable to him. 
POINT III 
NEITHER § 39-1-35 OR § 39-3-2 IS APPLI-
CABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF WASATCH FRONT 
As discussed above, § 39-1-35, which applies to members 
of the Guard, affords military leave pay only to state 
employees. Section 39-3-2, which applies to members of the 
Reserves, affords military leave pay to state employees and 
employees of any county and municipality thereof. Section 
39-3-1 is broader still, giving leave of absence and protec-
-10-
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tion against any diminution of benefits to both the Guard 
and reserves when called to active duty, and it applies to 
employees of the state, any municipal corporation, political 
subdivision or governmental district. 
Defendants contend that Wasatch Front's employees are 
state employees for purposes of §§ 39-1-35 and 39-3-2. They 
base this claim upon the Utah Interlocal Co-operation Act, 
§§ 11-13-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann., which provides that a 
separate legal entitiy formed pursuant to said act "is 
deemed a political subdivision of the state." § 11-13-5.5, 
Utah Code Ann. 
They then claim that employees of political subdivi-
sion of the state are state employees. This argument is 
unsound under the terms of both the Interlocal Co-operation 
Act and the three military benefit statutes discussed 
earlier. 
The definitional section of the Interlocal Co-operation 
Act, § 11-13-3, provides: 
Definitions. --The following terms wherever 
used or referred to in this act, shall have the 
following meanings: 
( 1) "Public agency" shall mean any 
political subdivision of this state, includ-
ing but not limited to cities, towns, 
counties, school districts and special 
districts of various kinds; any agency of 
the state government or of the United 
States; and any political subdivision of 
another state. 
-11-
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Thus, the term "public agency" includes political sub-
divisions such as cities, towns, counties, school districts, 
and special districts of various kinds. As already discussed, 
under §11-13-5.5 Wasatch Front is deemed to be a political 
subdivision. 
However, under defendants' contention that an employee 
of a political subdivision of the state is a state employee, 
every city employee, county employee, school district em-
ployee, and special district employee would also be a state 
employee. Such a result is absurd, and would make those 
separate terms meaningless as they are used in the military 
benefit statutes. 
The logical conclusion is again that the legislature 
used different terms in the different miltary benefit 
statutes intending to cover different groups of public 
employees. 
Accepting defendants' contention would also ignore the 
specific use of the term "governmental district" in the 1941 
act (§39-3-1) and the specific use of the term "political sub-
division of the state" in the title to that same statute, and 
would nullify the separate meaning of those terms. Obviously, 
if the legislature had intended § 39-1-35 to cover more than 
state employees, or for § 39-3-2 to cover more than state, 
county, and municipal employees, they could have used the 
-12-
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additional language found in§ 39-3-1. That different terms 
are specifically used in each statue precludes the defendants' 
contention that "state employees" means "employees of a politi-
cal subdivision of the state;" to hold otherwise would be to 
ignore an obvious legislative intent. 
As the employees of Wasatch Front are not state ern-
ployees, nor employees of a county or municipality, they are 
not included within the scope of §§ 39-1-35 or 39-3-2. 
POINT IV 
AT MOST ONLY § 39-3-2, AND NOT § 39-1-35, 
IS APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF WASATCH FRONT 
For purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30-1 
et seq., the Interlocal Co-operation Act, § 11-13-24, provides 
in part: 
Officers and employees performing services for two 
or more public agencies pursuant to contracts exe-
cuted under the provisions of this act shall be 
deemed to be officers and employees of the public 
agency employing their services ••.. 
In the instant case, the individual public agency members 
of Wasatch Front are various "county councils of government." 
Arguably, under the provisions of§ 11-13-24, cited above, em-
ployees of ~asatch Front are thereby deemed to be employees 
of councils, at least for some purposes. 
In the instant case, § 11-13-24 provides, at best, an awk-
ward result. Defendants' use of this appraoch in the instant 
case requires a conclusion that "employees of county councils 
of government" are equivalent to "county employees." This is 
-13-
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not the type of situation for which§ 11-13-24 was intended or 
should be used. It is a clearer and more satisfactory result 
to apply§ 11-13-5.5, cited earlier, and thereby conclude that 
Wasatch Front's employees are deemed employees of "a politi~l 
subdivision of the state." 
However, even assuming that Wasatch Front's employees 
are deemed county employees in the instant case, only § 39-3-2, 
and not § 39-1-35, purports to cover county employees. And, / 
as discussed earlier, § 39-3-2 is not applicable to members I 
of the Guard, but only to members of the Reserve. Therefore, . 
as defendant McEvilly is a Guard member, he cannot claim 
coverage under§ 39-3-2 even if Wasatch Front's employees are 
deemed county employees under the provisions of§ 11-13-24. 
POINT V 
WASATCH FRONT'S POLICY OF DIFFERENTIAL PAY IS 
THE FULL PAY REQUIRED BY §§ 39-1-35 AND 39-3-2. 
If Wasatch Front is subject to §§ 39-1-35 or 39-3-2, the 
question remains as to what is meant by "full pay." In de-
ciding such questions of statutory construction the court 
must again look at the entire statute to determine the intent 
of the legislature. In Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 
Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971), the court stated: 
[T]here is also this principle to be considered: 
that where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in 
a portion of a statute, it is proper to look to 
the entire act in order to discern its meaning 
and intent; and if it is reasonably susceptible 
of different interpretations, the one should be 
-14-
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chosen which best harmonizes with its general 
purpose. 485 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis added). 
Section 43 of the State Militia Act, Ch. 99, Laws of 
Utah 1917, enumerated specific dollar amounts for the pay 
of state militia in the service of the state. Section 43 
included the following restriction: 
Provided: that this State shall make no payments 
to members of the militia in the case of service 
for which the United States government makes pay-
ment. The annual encampment of the national guard 
will be considered as in the service of the State. 
Thus, duplicate federal-state payments were prohibited. 
As the annual encampment was considered state service, there 
was no federal payment involved. Therefore, no violation of 
the duplicate payment prohibition occurred when the state 
paid salaries of men in the militia. 
However, in 1919 the statute was amended as follows: 
Encampments of the National Guard shall be such as 
provided for by the Secretary of war, under Section 
94 of the Acts of Congress, approved June 3, 1916, 
known as the National Defense Act. The cost and 
maintenance, transportation, subsistence and expense 
for such enc~mpment and maneuvers shall not be paid 
by the State, but as provided for ~Section 94, Act 
of Congress, approved June 3, 1916. Ch. 75, Laws of 
Utah 1919 (emphasis added). 
Thus the expenses of annual encampment were no longer 
paid by the state, but by the federal government. As such, 
the duplicate federal-state payment prohibition would bar 
any state payment, such as that provided in § 39-1-35, where 
the services were compensated by the federal government. 
-15-
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The present statutes provide: 
39-1-51. Pay of national guard members. --When 
called into the service of the state and not in the 
service of the United States, the members of the 
national guard shall receive the same pay and allow-
ance as members of the regular army or regular air 
force of like rank and length of service. In addi-
tion to the above pay, officers and enlisted personnel 
shall receive one ration per day; provided, that this 
state shall make no payments to members of the national 
guard in the case of service for which the United 
States government makes payment. (Emphasis added). 
39-1-52. Encampments.--Encampments of the national 
guard shall be such as may be provided for by the 
national guard bureau and under authority of Congress. 
The cost of maintenance, transportion and subsistence, 
and other expenses of such encampments and maneuvers, 
shall not be paid by the state, but as provided for 
by Congress. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the additional pay claimed by defendants is pro-
hibited by the statutory language that the state make "no 
payment" to members of the Guard where the federal government 
has compensated them for their services. wasatch Front's 
policy of supplementing Guard or Reserve pay to the level of 
full civilian pay more closely complies with the legislative 
intent of prohibiting a double payment, as it only repre-
sents a supplement to the federal pay, and not a duplication 
thereof. In view of the rules of statutory construction pre-
scribed in Utah Savings, supra, and Grant, supra, Wasatch 
Front's differential pay approach appears to be the best 
solution to the otherwise ambiguous and conflicting statutes. , 
Further § 39-3-1 provides for protection against any 
diminution of employment benefits for public employees called 
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to active duty. There is no provision for additional bene-
fits. This is also the intent of § 39-1-35, which provides 
that time spent at National Guard annual encampments "shall 
not be deducted from" vacations, and of § 39-3-2, which pro-
vides that leave for Reservists "shall be in addition to 
annual vacation leave with pay." 
In accordance with this intent to prevent diminution in 
employment benefits, and with the direct prohibition of 
duplicate federal-state payments found in §§ 39-1-51 and 52, 
the term "full pay" as used in §§ 39-1-35 and 39-3-2 should 
be constured as requiring at most that the employer supple-
ment the employees' military pay to the level of his full 
civilian pay. 
CO~CLUSION 
The employees of Wasatch Front Regional Council are not 
state, county, or municipal employees within the meaning of 
§§ 39-1-35 or 39-3-2, Utah Code Ann., and therefore defendant 
McEvilly has no claim for more military leave pay than he has 
already received. 
Defend3nt McEvilly, a Guard member, is at most only 
covered by § 39-1-35, and not by § 39-3-2 which deals with 
~e~bers of the Reserves. However, Wasatch Front is at most 
subject only to the provisions of § 39-3-2, if its employees 
be deemed county employees under§ 11-13-24 of the Interlocal 
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Co-operation Act. Again the conclusion is that defendant 
McEvilly has no claim for more military leave pay than he has 
already received. 
Even if defendant McEvilly is entitled to "full pay" 
under either or both §§ 39-1-35 of 39-3-2, Wasatch Front has 
paid him all he is entitled to receive by reason of said sta-
tutes, as they have supplemented his Guard pay to the level 
of his full Wasatch Front pay. 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's Order of 
February 2, 1979, granting defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
should be reversed. 
RISTEN~N 
J.__J"-L-V--'"'----- /---------
Old G. Christensen 
-/) ~ ByPa~~·~~--L --
Attorneys for Pla~t~/?~ 
Appellant, Wasatch Front 
Regional Council 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two (2) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to each counsel 
for Respondents this~ day of May, 1979. 
___i2t ~--~~L __ _ 
Paul C. Droz - - · ·· /) 
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